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INTRODUCTION
The essays in this issue employ several more or less novel
methods to establish the plausibility of a relatively simple point.
The long tradition of legal thought that we have inherited and
through which we work accepted the relative autonomy of law, but
it systematically closeted relativity in an effort to expose and confirm autonomy. The specific mechanisms employed in the service
of this movement constitute an important chapter in the history
of liberalism, legalism, or the rule of law.
Kennedy's essay on Blackstone is the first published of his
larger study of the historically specific styles of legal consciousness-the specific management or deployment of doctrines, principles, and so forth. He argues that the fundamental purpose of
these strategies is to avoid confronting the dilemma of community
and autonomy as complicated by the mediation of state power. To
be sure, other contingent purposes intrude and these are considered as the occasion demands. His account of Blackstone's doctrinal organization iterates the unfolding story of relativity on
virtually every page.
Katz's essays in adjudication and politics are at once more
and less general. As essays in Boundary Theory they are simply
case studies working through a general notion of the categories
of thought and experience. On the other hand, there is only a
superficial attempt in these papers to say anything about the legal
consciousness of a period. While the doctrinal problem is taken
in historical context, Katz is at pains to show a pattern in the construction of doctrinal solutions and to offer a new account of why
these solutions seem critical.
Though the essays in this issue employ related methodologies,
it would be a mistake to read them entirely from the perspective
of method. Many of the legal scholars currently at work on a critical jurisprudence, including the two published here, share a belief that law is relative to social practice and social theory; that
contemporary jurisprudence is an obfuscating apologetic; that
legal analysis that gets relevant by gesturing outside law toward
a pseudo-consensus morality or the technical abstraction of efficiency has already lost its own battle for autonomy and is madly
searching for allies who have seemingly secured their own autonomous turf; that there can be no plausible legal theory without
a social theory; and that the notion of legal autonomy is a lie.
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